In 2006, Russia amended its competition law and added the concepts of "collective dominance" and its abuse. This was seen as an attempt to address the common problem of "conscious parallelism" among firms in concentrated industries. Critics feared that the enforcement of this provision would become tantamount to government regulation of prices. In this paper we examine the enforcement experience to date, looking especially closely at sanctions imposed on firms in the oil industry. Some difficulties and complications experienced in enforcement are analyzed, and some alternative strategies for addressing anticompetitive behavior in concentrated industries discussed.
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, Russia amended its competition law. Among many changes made, perhaps the most important was the introduction of the concept of "collective dominance", as a part of the associated and implicit concept of the abuse of collective dominance (Article 5). Along with the detailed elaboration of the concept of a "monopolistically high price" (Article 6) and the introduction of the concept of "concerted practices" (Article 8), the introduction of this new concept led businesses and analysts to fear that the new law would be used to control directly the prices charged by firms in concentrated markets. 1 The authors are grateful for helpful comments by Andrei Shastitko.
Of course, this broad issue is not unique to Russia, nor new to the area of competition law and policy. In a concentrated market, a small number of firms may be able to easily observe each other's actions and thus to behave in a manner that is better characterized as cooperative than competitive.
Furthermore, if the number of firms is sufficiently small and important market characteristics (like price) sufficiently transparent, the firms may behave in this cooperative manner without the necessity of resorting to explicit discussions or agreements. As we will discuss below, attempts by competition authorities in other jurisdictions -principally the US and the EU -to attack such cooperative behavior as illegal under the competition law have not met with much success. Tribunals and judges have been loath to punish firms for simply behaving in their own long-term interest, and have asked how they are to order the firms to pretend that they cannot observe the behavior of the other firms in the market and In what follows, we will describe the background and context in which these changes in the Russian competition law took place, with an emphasis on the introduction of the concept of collective dominance (Section II of the paper); consider the use of the concepts of collective dominance, conscious 2 A valuable recent discussion of these issues is provided in Andrey Shastitko, Collective Dominance Through the Lens of Comparative Antitrust, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, August 2011 (2). parallelism, and tacit collusion in other jurisdictions worldwide, particularly the European Union and the United States (Section III); relate in more detail the consequences of the new law as feared by businesses and analysts (Section IV); and describe the enforcement experience since the new law was enacted (Section V).
II. APPEARANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE IN RUSSIAN ANTIMONOPOLY LAW
The doctrine of collective dominance did not appear in the Russian antitrust legislation by accident:
its introduction was inspired by the contradiction between huge demand on competition policy measures and restricted abilities of anti-monopoly authorities. The Russian economy is dominated by resource-extracting, capital-intensive industries, each with a small number of interdependent producers. Structural characteristics of Russian markets make them prone to tacit collusion as a set of independent sellers' strategies. 3 Traditions of tight horizontal coordination of prices under socialism strengthened the incentives for tacit as well as explicit collusion as a part of normal business practice.
Only ten years ago about one third of general directors of Russian manufacturing enterprises were sure that producers colluding to fix prices are not subject to sanctions under the anti-monopoly law. 4 Russian antitrust authorities historically have had limited capacity to prevent not only tacit coordination, but also explicit collusion. FAS and its regional branches have had no right to conduct clandestine investigations on their own. Lack of power complicated the gathering of direct evidence of price-fixing and market-sharing agreements. Only recently, cooperation between FAS and the Ministry of Internal Affairs RF has permitted the gathering of evidence of overt anti-competitive agreements. The ability to detect and sanction tacit as opposed to overt collusion has been even more limited.
On the other hand, from the first years of competition law enforcement in Russia, the antitrust authorities have more effectively initiated and won cases of abuse of dominance (Article 5 of Evidence that supports the conclusion on dominance itself is based on structural analysis, which is significantly more developed in Russia than analysis of conduct.
This facilitates the cases against dominant market participants. Guidelines for market competition analysis elaborated by FAS also concentrate mostly on the structural features of markets as indicators of competition. Many authors explain the introduction of the collective dominance doctrine in Russian anti-monopoly legislation as an attempt to reduce enforcement costs by addressing the market structure that is the ultimate cause of high prices rather than continually addressing the symptoms -the high prices themselves.
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In the new version of the law "On protection of competition" adopted in 2006, collective dominance is defined as a market in which all of the following conditions are present: As we will discuss below, the concept of a position of collective dominance in a market has been used by EU competition authorities for some years now. However, most proponents of the doctrine of collective dominance in the EU competition law probably did not anticipate the use of the concept provided by the Russian legislation. According to one of the most prominent European experts, Patrick
Rey, in order to prevent collusion, the doctrine of collective dominance should be used primarily as a basis for the detection and prevention of "facilitating practices". 6 Another direction where the notion of collective dominance could be applied in antitrust policy is in merger control. • First, market transactions must be sufficiently transparent that the oligopolists may monitor each others' behavior;
• Second, there must be means to retaliate if one oligopolist behaves too competitively; and
• Third, the coordinated outcome should be unlikely to be disturbed by actions of either competitors or customers.
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Regarding EU merger enforcement, the concept of collective dominance was much more important before the revisions to the ECMR in 2004, since the original regulation prohibited only those mergers that would "result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position." Without the concept of collective dominance, that formulation would have dictated an enforcement focus aimed much more directly at "unilateral effects" than at "coordinated effects". Now that the regulation also prohibits mergers that would "significantly impede effective competition", concerns about mergers that may increase the likelihood of oligopolistic coordination may be addressed without so much focus on the concept of collective dominance. In the United States, the concept of collective dominance has for the most part been considered under the rubric of "conscious parallelism", and examined in the context of illegal agreements under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, rather than in the context of monopolization under Section 2.
Cases from a number of years ago made clear that agency enforcement actions seeking to sanction coordinated behavior among oligopolists would face clear limits. Commission in 1982 to address collective dominance as "shared monopoly" behavior in the breakfast cereal industry, to be considered illegal as an "unfair practice" under Section 5 of the FTC Act, was not successful. 16 The Federal Trade Commission was also unsuccessful in its Ethyl 17 and DuPont 18 cases (1983-84) attacking the parallel adoption by oligopolists of "facilitating practices" -conventions such as quoting delivered prices only and announcing price changes in advance, arguably in order to "facilitate" tacit collusion -as illegal agreements under Section 1.
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In the context of Section 1, the courts have made it clear that parallel behavior, by itself, does not prove a conspiracy and is therefore not illegal (Theatre Enterprises 20 ). Rather, for parallel behavior to constitute evidence of a conspiracy, it must be accompanied by certain "plus factors", such as evidence of "raising prices in time of oversupply" (American Tobacco
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Among the most important plus factors are those that tend to show that the conduct would be in the parties' self-interests if they all agreed to act in the same way but would be contrary to their selfinterests if they acted alone.
), "artificial standardization of products", and "pretextual explanations for a course of action". As summarized by a leading treatise, Antitrust and Regulation, Dryden Press, 1995. 17 In the matter of Ethyl Corp. et al., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983) .
18 E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co. et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, 729 F. 2d 128 (1984) .
19 Scherer and Ross, ibid.; Kaserman and Mayo, ibid.
20 Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp. et al., 346 U.S. 537 (1954 And of course US competition law has no provision regarding the "monopolistically high price of goods" thousand cases annually, and this number continues to grow). Second is the focus of the abuse cases, significantly skewed towards the cases on exploitative behavior in contrast to exclusionary behavior.
Third are the apparently low standards of proof of abuse when there is direct evidence of harm to a counterparty -that is, a customer, competitor, or supplier of the dominant firm. Let us consider two examples: excessive price ('high monopolistic price' as defined in the law), and unjustified difference of prices and other contractual terms (discrimination) by a dominant supplier.
Article 6 of the competition law contains two criteria by which prices may be judged to be excessive or monopolistically high: the excess of price over the price in a comparable competitive market and the excess of price over the costs and profits necessary for production and sale of goods. However, the requirements for market comparability are so high that in most cases competition authorities and courts must utilize the second criterion and compare price with cost. In turn, FAS tends to estimate costs on the basis of accounting reports designed for tax collection purposes, with the result that important components of the economic costs, particularly for companies in capital-intensive industries, may be underestimated. The issue of "necessary and reasonable" cost and profit remains the most difficult and contentious in Russian cases on "excessive price". There are no legal standards for price-cost margin or rate of return on capital invested. The typical analysis used by FAS involves the comparison of changes in price with changes in cost: it is presumed that if the increase in prices substantially exceeds the increase in costs, this is evidence of abuse. This approach induces market participants to seek standards of "fair"
or "allowable" price-cost margins in negotiations with antitrust authorities and government. For instance, the CEOs of at least two of the four Russian oil companies accused of charging excessive prices expressed willingness to follow prices set by government from the very start of litigation. In this way use of collective dominance doctrine in Russia becomes a method of "quasi-price regulation".
Issues of the precise nature of a violation and standard of proof arise also in cases alleging that a firm has engaged in price discrimination (prohibited as an abuse of dominance in Article 10 of the law).
In practice, even accidental, unsystematic differences in prices have sometimes been considered illegal by antitrust authorities and courts, and whether different transactions are in fact equivalent may be given little attention. According to the decisions of the Supreme Arbitration Court on the cases against TNK-BP (May 2010) and Gazpromneft (February 2011), sufficient requirements for equivalence are the physical equivalence of the product and the same legal form of the contract. The illegality of "unjustified price differences" seems to reflect a general trend of Russian antitrust policy to prohibit and punish the harm imposed on buyers from and/or sellers to the dominant firm or firms. Different contractual terms or different conditions of contract fulfillment by a dominant supplier seem to be attacked as illegal not so much because they may restrict competition as because they harm the counterparty.
In these circumstances, the opportunity to qualify the company as a participant in a collectively 
V. APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL REGULATION OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE
To analyze how the concept of collective dominance, as well as its abuse, has been applied, we sought to collect all decisions of FAS and the courts in which collective dominance was considered. We found 33 cases using publicly available sources. This data was collected from FAS and its regional subdivisions and from decisions of courts at different levels (Arbitration tribunals, Courts of appeal, Federal arbitration courts). There were several restrictions on our ability to collect data. First, the text of decisions on recognition of economic entities as collectively dominant are not always accessible on the websites of FAS and its regional subdivisions. This is particularly a problem for regional subdivisions of FAS. Second, FAS sometimes uses data that contain commercial secrets, so confidentiality rules mean that not all the text of some decisions is disclosed. Therefore there are often conclusions that state that economic entities are collective dominant in the market, but for the reader there is no way to discover what type of evidence confirms the conclusion.
Due to these restrictions on information about cases relating to collective dominance, we assume that if the text of a FAS or court decision mentions an indicator of collective dominance (the indications of collective dominance are in Art. 5, part 3, paragraphs 1-3 of the Law, as summarized earlier in this paper), then FAS based its analysis on this indicator and used it to prove or disprove collective dominance in the market. We will consider first the entire set of cases and then proceed to analyze more closely the important and controversial cases against the oil companies.
A. CASES CONCERNED WITH COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE: A BROAD VIEW
The collected cases cover a period of four years: the first decision we have found was approved on April 2007, and the last one was approved on April 2011. Violations of the Law were found by FAS in many different product markets overall, but nearly half of the total were in gasoline and diesel fuel markets. Geographical market boundaries also differ across cases. In our sample we have cases where market boundaries are the city, the region, and the whole country. (There are no cases in our sample where the geographic market found is larger than the territory of the Russian Federation.) The information on all the decisions of FAS that we found is presented in Table 1 . 
Source: compiled from the data of FAS central and regional offices decisions (posted on the websites) and decisions of courts (arbitration tribunals, courts of appeal and federal arbitration courts) of Russian Federation
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On the basis of Art. 5, part 3 of the Law we summarize the following groups of conditions that are required to recognize economic entities as collectively dominant:
First group: -market shares of economic entities;
Second group: -stability of the market shares over time;
-barriers to the entry of new competitors to the relevant market;
Third group: -low cross-price elasticity of demand with other commodities;
-low own-price elasticity of demand;
-wide availability of information about the price -wide availability of information about conditions of selling or purchasing the commodity.
The number of times each of these factors is cited in our cases is presented in chart 1.
Chart 1. Number of Cases that Include Certain Indicators of Collective Dominance
As may be seen from chart 1, it appears from the information made available that cases do not always contain all the elements necessary to prove collective dominance listed in the law. FAS has apparently devoted most of its attention to the 21 first group of conditions, market shares --these were examined in all 33 cases. In 14 cases of 33 market shares were the only evidence reported in favor of collective dominant position of economic entities.
According to the Guidelines of market competition analysis elaborated by FAS, the notion of "stability of market shares" means that during a long period (not less than a year, except in cases where the relevant commodity market has existed for less than a year, in which case the period considered is the full time of the market's existence) the relative sizes of such economic entities' shares are stable or subjected to insignificant changes. In cases where stability of shares was analyzed, FAS usually considered nearly 2-year periods of analysis. However, in several cases it was impossible to determine the period of analysis because the text of the decision contained only the following phrase:
"the relative sizes of economic entities' shares were stable during a long period". There 
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Overall we found that evidence relating to all three groups of conditions that are required to classify economic entities as collectively dominant was reported in only 9
cases. This would suggest that economic entities can dispute whether the collective dominance position has been proved by referring to the second and third groups of conditions, but in practice they usually limit themselves to disputing the first group.
We have found information that the decisions of 26 of the 31 cases were being disputed in the courts. The distribution of the grounds on which FAS decisions were appealed is presented at Chart 2.
The definition of the product market is the element of analysis that is disputed in the courts most frequently in comparison with other elements. In our sample this occurred in 20 of 31 cases. Among them were 7 cases where the method of defining the product market boundaries was disputed. The procedure of establishing the product boundaries normally requires using a method based on the information received from customers of the product or on the result of survey sample of customers. ,the accused firm argued that two cities had been wrongly included in the geographic 23 boundaries of the market. FAS admitted this mistake but convinced the court that this circumstance did not affect the validity of its conclusion about the dominant position of the applicant in the local product market. Therefore, the decision about the position of collective dominance remained in force.
Chart 2. Number of Cases in which Certain Components of Analysis were Disputed at Courts
The volume of the product market, the market participants, and their shares were also frequently the subject of appeals. In contrast, entry barriers for new competitors were the grounds for appeal in only 2 cases. In one of these cases the economic entities showed that during the period of analysis, two new competitors entered the market and argued that this provided evidence that entry barriers are surmountable.
This analysis confirms that in cases of collective dominance, structural analysis prevails, and the characteristics of market structure are used both by FAS and economic 24 entities in making their cases. The most important elements of analysis are the definitions of product and geographic markets. The least used elements (and indications of collective dominance) are entry barriers, elasticity of demand, and the availability of information about the price and conditions of selling or purchasing.
The majority of the cases we have collected regarding collective dominance concern the abuse of a dominant position. In our sample we have cases with the following alleged forms of abuse:
-establishment and maintaining of monopolistically high or monopolistically low price for a commodity, corresponding to excessively high and predatory price in international practice (11 cases);
-withdrawal of a commodity from circulation, if the result of such withdrawal is increase of price of the commodity (3 cases);
-imposing on a counterparty contractual terms which are unprofitable for the latter or not connected with the subject of agreement (exploitation of counterparty) (1 case);
-economically or technologically unjustified reduction or cutting off the production of a commodity (1 case);
-economically or technologically unjustified refusal to conclude a contract with individual purchasers (customers) (as a form of discrimination) (2 cases);
-economically, technologically or in any other way unjustified establishment of different prices (tariffs) for one and the same commodity, as another type of discrimination (7 cases);
-creation of discriminatory conditions broadly (10 cases);
-violation of the procedure of pricing established by sector-specific statutory legal acts (1 case).
In a significant number of cases the form of abuse is excessive price. As noted above, excessive price is defined in article 6 of the competition law as price exceeding the price of the comparable competitive market or (if there are no comparable competitive markets) the sum of costs and profits needed for production and sale.
According to the Law the comparable commodity market is a market comparable by the structure of customers or sellers of the product, by the conditions of circulation and access at product market, by the government control including taxation and customs/tariff regulation. As noted, the second part of the definition of excessive price, relying on the analysis of costs and profits, is used more often in Russian antimonopoly cases because of very strict criteria to consider a market as comparable. However, as also noted, the definition of costs and profit needed for production and sale is absent at the Law. The Law also does not determine the allowable profit margin of firms or rate of return of capital.
In the case of Aeroflot the FAS analyzed the increase of air fares on the MoscowKaliningrad and Kaliningrad-Moscow routes. FAS considered cost data and concluded that the increase in prices of airline tickets did not correspond to the cost increases. So the prices were examined as monopolistically high. More detailed analysis of prices was not presented in the text of the decision. However, this decision was overruled by the Court. One of the key arguments in favor of Aeroflot's position was its demonstration that during the time period in question, it lost money on this route.
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To analyze the price level at the retail market of gasoline and diesel fuel, FAS used data on wholesale prices, price markups, distribution costs and retail prices. In the case of LUKOIL-Severo-Zapadnefteprodukt, 33 The case of Krasnoyarsknefteproduct FAS showed that retail prices had fallen significantly less than wholesale prices. 
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Krasnoyarsk oblast) and found that two firms were in a position of collective dominance.
In addition to analysis of wholesale prices, price markups, distribution costs, and retail prices in the village, FAS examined retail prices in comparable markets. In the end, FAS concluded that there was no unjustified increase of profitability, and thus no violation of the law.
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In those cases from our sample that come from the courts, the subjects of it is displayed at the gas station. Moreover, the possibility of the parallel, "cooperative" behavior could be ensured without explicit agreement, written or otherwise. 
COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE IN THE MARKETS FOR OIL PRODUCTS
The concept of collective dominance was applied in the largest and most visible groups of cases against Russian oil companies -Lukoil, TNK-BP, Rosneft, and Gazprom The forms of abuse of dominance in these two cases differed. In the first cases the companies were accused of excessive ("monopolistically high") prices and discrimination among buyers in wholesale market of oil products, while in the second, of "unjustified withdrawal of a commodity from the market" and discrimination. However, the standards of proving the collective dominance in the two decisions of RF Supreme Arbitration Court were very close.
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Analysis of these cases is interesting for several reasons. First of all, these are cases against some of the largest companies in Russia. The sum of sales proceeds of these companies equals nearly 15 % of the GDP of Russia. Second, these markets are very important from the social point of view. The Prime Minister has repeatedly spoken about the need to control price increases in retail fuel markets. Third, two of these cases were considered by the Supreme Arbitration Court, so these decisions must be employed when courts consider similar cases. Finally, these decisions of FAS contain more detailed analysis than many other published decisions.
During September-October 2008 FAS identified these four oil companies as collectively dominant.
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The Supreme Arbitration Court made a final decision on this dispute. According to its decisions № 16678/09
The product boundaries of market were defined as the wholesale markets for gasoline, diesel fuel, heating fuel oil, and aircraft kerosene.
According to FAS the geographic boundaries of these markets cover the territory of Russia. Such identification of geographical boundaries became a subject of disputes in the courts because, according to the competition law, the geographic boundaries of the market should be defined based on the possibilities of customers to buy the product and on the economic feasibility of switching to another seller in the geographic market.
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Russian Federation by collectively dominant vertically integrated entities. The main reasoning of such broad definition of geographical market boundaries was based on the nationwide allocation of oil-processing enterprises of the companies. The ability of buyers to substitute the delivery from sellers in different regions of this national geographic market was not addressed by the court. These market boundaries were used to calculate market shares of the firms. The individual and collective market shares of the four companies exceeded the threshold set by the law regarding collective dominance, and the size of shares was considered by the court as a main indicator of collective dominance.
Regarding entry barriers, the Supreme Arbitration Court mentioned only vertical integration in oil production, processing, wholesale and retail trade. According to its decision, vertical integration itself discourages entry into all the markets along the value chain.
Regarding the own-elasticities of demand facing the companies, FAS showed that in all four markets the rate of increase in prices exceeded the rate of decrease in quantity demanded. Other factors that could influence the demand (change in incomes, seasonal variations) were not considered. Consequently the elasticity calculations potentially missed the "other things being equal" condition. At its decision the FAS considered such lack of correspondence between price and quantity changes as evidence of collective dominance.
In the first wave of cases the companies were charged with various types of violations, but all of them were accused of setting monopolistically high prices. All four decisions contain only analysis of costs and profits as the courts ruled that there was no way to find comparable commodity markets. Such an approach to the analysis of monopolistically high prices was supported by the Supreme Arbitration Court.
This part of decision of the FAS concluded that the increases in the prices of the products charged by the companies were greater than the increases in their costs, and were also greater than the increase in the wholesale price index for the economy. (It is unclear how important this second conclusion was for FAS.)
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All of these conclusions contain analyses of the prices, costs, and profits "needed for production and sale". However, as mentioned above, the law does not provide specifics on what price mark-ups or profit rates might be "needed" in a market, nor what determines whether increases in those rates are permissible. (For example, could the companies seek to show that last period's profits were below what is "needed", so that price increases greater than cost increases this period are "needed"?)
As the prices of oil in Russian markets are influenced by prices on world markets, FAS analyzed the dynamics of these markets for the period October 2007 -September 2008. FAS found that when wholesale oil products prices increased on the external market, domestic retail prices increased at the same or higher rate, and the lag was minimal. On the other hand, when wholesale oil prices fell on the external market, domestic retail prices fell at lower rate or did not fall at all -and the lag of falling retail prices after falling wholesale prices was greater than when prices were increasing.
In the second case the accusation of "unjustified withdrawal of a commodity from the market" replaced the accusation of "excessive price". The increase of export volumes were regarded as a cause for the reduction in quantity and the increase of prices of oil products in domestic retail markets in the early 2009. This suggests a role for the government corresponding to the "price regulator" role implied by the judging of reasonable margins of cost over price: to avoid the accusation of "unjustified withdrawal of commodity from the market", must a dominant firm seek a ruling from FAS or the government as to its permitted level of exports?
In both cases -the decision on Gazprom Neft case as well as on TNK-BP -the principal form of discrimination found to violate the law was the charging of higher prices to independent wholesale customers as compared to the prices charged to company subsidiaries. In addition, there was some emphasis placed on the refusal to supply independent wholesale customers during periods of supply shortage.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Russia is a country with its own unique economic and political problems and challenges. Among these is its legacy of state economic control and monopoly and 31 "giantism" of economic enterprises. A great deal of debate has already taken place concerning the best ways to reform and restructure markets in order to create and encourage the forces of competition going forward.
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One recommended strategy has been an antimonopoly policy more aggressive than that found in countries with more market-friendly histories, like the US and countries of the EU. Of course, this is not the only strategy available for attacking the problems associated with a heritage of concentrated markets; nor is it the only strategy being utilized by the government of the RF. 43 Other policies that can be and are being used include the reduction of barriers to international trade, the improvement of transport infrastructure, the investigation and prosecution of protectionist actions by local and regional governments (under Articles 15 and 16 of the competition law), the encouragement of innovation, the introduction of competition into "natural monopoly" sectors,
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In this paper we have examined the enforcement and litigation results of the use of a new tool for attacking tacit collusion: the bringing of cases against the abuse of a position of collective dominance in a market. Experience with this and similar tools in other jurisdictions suggested that it would be difficult for antimonopoly authorities to This is not to suggest that the adoption of this new legal tool was or was not a good idea. It is to suggest that this tool has problems like any other, and that these problems should be kept in mind as the country goes forward in antimonopoly enforcement. We hope that our analysis will serve to contribute to the learning from experience that will continue to strengthen Russian antimonopoly enforcement in the years to come.
